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HEALTH LAW-The Tenth Circuit Lowers the Evidentiary
Burden to Overcome Peer Review Immunity Under the
Health Care Quality Improvement Act-Brown v.
Presbyterian Healthcare Services
I. INTRODUCTION
In Brown v. PresbyterianHealthcare Services,' the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals lowered the evidentiary burden on plaintiffs seeking to overcome the peer
review immunity conferred by the Health Care Quality Improvement Act2 (HCQIA
or Act). The HCQIA grants qualified immunity from money damages to peer review
participants, provided that the peer review actions are conducted in accordance with
the requirements of the Act.3 The Brown court found that physician plaintiffs need
show only that a difference of opinion exists among medical experts on whether the
scope of the review was reasonable to create an issue of fact for the jury. The
court's decision reduces the protection that the Act affords physician peer reviewers
by increasing the likelihood that disciplined physicians with minimal evidence that
a peer review was conducted unreasonably will file suit. The decision also increases
the burden on peer review participants seeking to avoid a jury trial to show that the
scope of their review was broad enough to preclude a difference of expert opinion.
This Note examines the Tenth Circuit's rationale in Brown, analyzes the ruling's
relationship to current case law, and discusses several judicial options for
considering HCQIA immunity issues in the future. It addresses the potential effect
and implications of the court's holdings on medical peer review and related
litigation in the Tenth Circuit. Finally, this Note includes recommendations for
practitioners within the Tenth Circuit regarding HCQIA immunity issues.
4

11. FACTS
Dr. Arlene Brown is a family practitioner who held staff and clinical privileges,
including obstetrical privileges, at Lincoln County Medical Center in Ruidoso, New
Mexico. During an informal peer review in early 1992, Dr. Vickie Williams, an
obstetrician-gynecologist, raised concerns regarding Dr. Brown's care of three
patients. The hospital administrator, Ms. Valerie Miller, referred the charts of these
three patients to outside specialists for review.6 Dr. Brown subsequently agreed to
1. 101 F.3d 1324 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1461 (1997).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (1994).
3. Four elements must be satisfied to obtain immunity under the Act. See id. § 11112(a).
4. Facts adapted from Brown, 101 F.3d at 1327-28.
5. Dr. Williams was the only obstetrician-gynecologist in Ruidoso at the time. See Anne L Finger, An FP
Wins a Harrowing Battle in the ObstetricsTurf War, MED. ECON., Aug. 25, 1997, at 116, 118. In that article,
competition for non-indigent patients, hard feelings over Brown's 1991 bankruptcy filing, and anti-Semitism were
raised as possible motives for the defendants' actions. See id. at 117-18.
6. Ms. Miller forwarded the charts, together with a "summary of concerns" prepared by Dr. Williams, to
two Albuquerque obstetrical specialists, Drs. Gary Aisenbrey and James Hutchison. See id. at 121 (quoting Valerie
Miller). The outside specialists' comments were submitted to the hospital's Executive Committee. See Brown, 101
F.3d at 1327. The three incidents involved questions of whether a patient's labor should have been induced,
whether Dr. Brown should have called Dr. Williams earlier in a patient's problematic labor, and whether Dr. Brown
appropriately intervened in a placental delivery. See Finger, supra note 5, at 121. According to the defendantsappellants' brief, both physicians criticized certain aspects of care in two of the cases and disagreed as to the third.
See Brief for Appellants at 10, Brown v. Presbyterian Healthcare Servs., 101 F.3d 1324 (10th Cir. 1996) (Nos. 95-

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28

consult with an obstetrical specialist when caring for high-risk obstetrical patients.
In February 1993, Ms. Miller instituted formal peer review proceedings against
Dr. Brown, claiming that she failed to honor the prior consultation agreement. 7 A
peer review panel of three physicians reviewed charts of two of Dr. Brown's
patients and heard testimony from Drs. Brown and Williams. After concluding that
Dr. Brown breached her agreement to consult, the panel recommended removing
her obstetrical privileges. Following Medical Executive Committee approval, the
Board of Trustees adopted the panel's recommendations and the hospital submitted
a report of the adverse action to the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB). In
preparing the NPDB report, Ms. Miller and the medical staff coordinator (Ms.
Perry) selected "Incompetence/Malpractice/Negligence" as the "Adverse Action
Classification Code."
Dr. Brown filed suit seeking injunctive relief and damages for various claims
arising from the revocation of her privileges and the filing of the NPDB report.8
After determining that the defendants were not entitled to the HCQIA's immunity
for peer review activities, the district court jury found for Dr. Brown on the
defamation, intentional interference with contract, and some of the antitrust claims.9
The court entered an amended judgment, setting aside damages related to the
contract claim and the antitrust punitive damages.' Both parties appealed to the
Tenth Circuit."
III. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In 1986, Congress found that the rising rates of medical malpractice and the need
to improve the quality of medical care constituted a nationwide problem.' Although
Congress determined that "effective professional peer review" could remedy this
problem, 3 it found that physicians were discouraged from acting as peer reviewers

2293 & 96-2013) (citing Appellants' Appendix at 657-60 & Transcript at 399-402, 406-09, 480,487, 496). One
of the specialists suggested that "this physician [Dr. Brown] obtain obstetrical consultation for any high risk
antenatal patient." Id. (quoting Appellants' Appendix at 656). The plaintiff-appellee's brief indicated that one of
the outside reviewers was a PHS employee, and the other reviewer did not believe that the three charts demonstrated
"significant breaches of the standard of care." Brief of Appellees at 6-7, Brown v. Presbyterian Healthcare Servs.,
101 F.3d 1324 (10th Cir. 1996) (Nos. 95-2293 & 96-2013) (citing Transcript at 379-81, 429-30).
7. Dr. Williams and Nurse McCallum brought two cases for review. See Finger, supra note 5, at 121. These
two cases involved women in possible preterm labor for whom Dr. Brown prescribed medication. See id. at 121-22.
In the first case, there were no complications after Dr. Brown treated the woman with terbutaline, other than a brief
period of hospitalization. See id. at 121. The second case involved a patient "clearly in preterm labor" for whom
Brown prescribed a repeat dose of medications that Williams had previously recommended. See id. at 122. When
the drugs failed to work, Brown contacted Williams and an Albuquerque perinatologist. See id. The perinatologist
arranged for air transport of the patient to Albuquerque where the patient delivered a healthy baby. See id.
8. See Brown, 101 F.3d at 1327.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id. Plaintiff appealed the order to vacate the awards for both tortious interference with contract and
the antitrust punitive damages. See id. at 1329. Defendants appealed the court's refusal to find HCQIA immunity
as a matter of law, in addition to its refusal to enter judgment as a matter of law on the merits of the antitrust and
defamation claims. See id. at 1332-33. The circuit court reversed the district court's order vacating Plaintiffs
compensatory and punitive damages for tortious interference with contract, and affirmed on all other issues. See
id. at 1336.
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 11101(l)(1994).
13. Id. § 11101(3).
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by the threat of private money damages. 4 Congress concluded that there was an
"overriding national need" to encourage and protect those physicians participating
5
in effective peer review.
In light of these findings, Congress enacted the HCQIA, in an attempt to
encourage professional peer review among physicians 6 by providing protection
from private money damage liability related to peer review activities. 7 Under the
HCQIA, a peer review participant's activities enjoy immunity from private damage
claims, provided that the peer review actions are conducted:
(1) in the reasonable belief that the action was in the furtherance of quality
health care,
(2) after a reasonable effort to obtain the facts of the matter,
(3) after adequate notice and hearing procedures ... ,and
(4) in the reasonable belief that the action was warranted by the facts known
after such reasonable effort to obtain facts."a
If all four criteria are met, a peer review participant "shall not be liable in
damages."' 9 To qualify for the Act's protection, the statute further requires that
health care entities report all adverse peer review actions to the Board of Medical
Examiners. 20 Under the HCQIA, a peer review action is presumed to satisfy the four
elements of 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a). 2' The plaintiff must prove by a preponderance
of the evidence that one or more elements were not met in order to rebut the
presumed immunity of a defendant's peer review action.2 2 Courts, relying on the
language of the statute and the Act's legislative history, have construed this
immunity to extend only to money damages.23 Therefore, a plaintiff denied damages
pursuant to HCQIA immunity may still seek injunctive and25declaratory relief. 24 In
other words, the Act does not provide immunity from suit.
A. Subjective v. Objective Standard
Three of the four immunity elements under 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a) incorporate
"reasonableness" in the criteria for assessing a peer review action.26 Two of these
three elements explicitly require "reasonable belief."'27 Despite the presence of

14. See id. § 11101(4).
15. See id. § 11101(5).
16. See id.
17. See id. § I1101(4).
18. Id. § IIII2(a).
19. Id. § IlIII(a)(1).
20. See id. § IllI(b), 11133(a).
21. See id. § III12(a).
22. See id.
23. See Imperial v. Suburban Hosp. Ass'n, 37 F.3d 1026, 1031 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that HCQIA
protection is "limited to damages liability").
24. See Bryan v. Holmes, 33 F.3d 1318, 1322 (1 ith Cir. 1994).
25. See Manion v. Evans, 986 F.2d 1036, 1042 (6th Cir. 1993) (finding that the HCQIA does not grant the
right not to stand trial). See also Decker v. IHC Hosp. Ass'n, 982 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that denials
of motions to dismiss under the HCQIA are not immediately appealable).
26. See § 1I112(a)(1), (2), (4).
27. See id. § III 2(a)(1), (4) (emphasis added).
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subjective language" in the statute and supporting legislative history,2 9 the circuit
courts that have addressed this matter overwhelmingly apply an objective
standard.3 °
B. Establishingthe HCQIA 's Objective "Reasonable Belief' Standard
Austin v. McNamara31 illustrates the adoption and application of the objective
interpretation of the HCQIA's "reasonable belief' standard. The plaintiff-neurosurgeon in Austin challenged the defendant's immunity under the HCQIA based on
evidence that the other neurosurgeons were hostile and contemptuous of him. 32 The
Austin court examined the HCQIA's legislative history to determine whether
Congress intended the reasonableness requirements to create an objective or
subjective standard. 33 Ultimately, the court construed the reasonableness requirements to represent an objective standard that precluded its consideration of any
evidence of bad faith.34
Presumably, the Brown court, in accord with Austin, rejected any consideration
of animosity or anti-competitive motives of the defendants 35 in determining the
issue of HCQIA immunity. 36 The Tenth Circuit Court relied on persuasive
38
authority 3 7 in accepting the objective standard described in Austin and Mathews.
In this respect, Brown follows the majority of circuit courts in its application of the
objective standard to the HCQIA "reasonableness" requirements of 42 U.S.C.

28. See id. (requiring "reasonable belief') (emphasis added). "Encouraging Good FaithProfessional Review
Activities" is the title of the HCQIA's chapter 117. See id. §§ 11101-11152 (emphasis added).
29. The House Committee on Energy and Commerce originally considered a "good faith" standard for peer
review actions. See H.R. REP. No.99-903, at 10 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6384, 6392. Responding
to concerns that courts would require "only a test of the [peer reviewers'] subjective state of mind .. .the
Committee changed to a more objective 'reasonable belief' standard." Id. at 10, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6392-93
(emphasis added).
30. See, e.g., Mathews v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 87 F.3d 624,635 (3d Cir. 1996) (determining that Congress
intended to create an objective standard by using the words "reasonable belief"); Bryan v. Holmes, 33 F.3d 1318,
1323 (11 th Cir. 1994). ("[Tbhe statute's reasonableness requirements were intended to create an objective standard
of performance, rather than a subjective good faith standard."); Austin v. McNamara, 979 F.2d 728, 734 (9th Cir.
1992) (one dissenting) (concluding that peer review participants' bad faith is immaterial because the § 11112(a)
reasonableness standards test is objective).
31. 979 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1992).
32. See id. at 734.
33. See id. (discussing H.R. REP. No.99-903, at 10); see also supranote 29.
34. See Austin, 979 F.2d at 734. The Austin court dismissed the plaintiff's allegations of peer review
animosity as "irrelevant to the reasonableness standards of § 11112(a)." Id.
35. The court described evidence indicating that Drs. Williams and Brown were not only competitors, but
experienced a personality conflict. See Brown v. Presbyterian Healthcare Servs., 101 F.3d 1324, 1335 (10th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1461 (1997). The court further indicated that Dr. Williams and a nurse who made
anti-Semitic remarks about Dr. Brown were responsible for selecting all five of the charts reviewed during the peer
review process. See id.
36. In Brown, the jury considered evidence of the defendants' bad faith as elements of other claims, because
the plaintiff's attorney structured the lawsuit to include prima facie tort, defamation, tortious interference with
contract, and antitrust actions. See Brown, 101 F.3d at 1327.
37. Both Austin and Mathews were decisions of other circuits, neither of which were affirmed at the U.S.
Supreme Court level.
38. See Brown, 101 F.3d at 1333 (citing Mathews, 87 F.3d at 635; Austin, 979 F.2d at 734) (noting that
reasonableness of peer review actions determined by objective standard). The court did not reexamine the language
of the statute, see supra note 28, or the legislative history on this issue, see supra note 29.
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§ 11112(a). 39 However, the court uniquely made reference to the plaintiff's expert
witness in finding that his opinion testimony created a jury question on the issue of
"reasonable effort."'
IV. RATIONALE
The court found that Brown successfully challenged the defendants' immunity
under the HCQIA by presenting "sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find,
by a preponderance of the evidence, the peer review4 action was not taken after a
'reasonable effort to obtain the facts of the matter.'
Because this is an essential
4 2 the court determined that the defendant
element for immunity under the HCQIA,
was not entitled to the Act's protection from monetary damages.43
Before analyzing the HCQIA immunity issues the Brown court reviewed the
reasons for the statute's enactment. 44 It noted that Congress determined a need to
"provide qualified immunity from damages actions for hospitals, doctors and others
who participate in professional peer review. ' '4' The court briefly described the
HCQIA's four peer review immunity requirements' and the accompanying
presumption standard under the Act.47 Finally, the Brown court noted its acceptance
of the objective standard for determining the reasonableness of a peer review action
under the HCQIA.48
A. Overcoming the Immunity Presumption
The Brown court relied on the testimony of the plaintiff's expert witness, Dr.
Norman Lindley, in upholding the finding that the defendants were not entitled to
the qualified immunity of the HCQA.49 Dr. Lindley testified that he disagreed both
with the review panel's final decision regarding Dr. Brown," and with the panel's
of only
method of review.5 Specifically, he objected to the panel's formal review
52
two charts prior to its final decision as being "unreasonably narrow.
The Brown court referred to the number of reviewed charts, the length of panel
39. See cases cited supra note 30.
40. See Brown, 101 F.3d at 1334.
41. Id. at 1333 (quoting the statutory language of 42 U.S.C. § Ill 12(a)(2)).
42. See § 11112(a)(2).
43. See Brown, 101 F.3d at 1334. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court's finding
that Defendants were not, as a matter of law, immune from damages related to the revocation of Plaintiffs
obstetrical privileges. See id.
44. See id. at 1333. Referring to the Act's findings, the court noted the Congress' concern with rising
medical malpractice claims, the need for improved quality of medical care, and the discouraging effect of the threat
of money damages on physician participation in professional peer review. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 11101).
45. Id. (citing Imperial v. Suburban Hosp. Ass'n, 37 F.3d 1026, 1028 (4th Cir. 1994)).
46. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a)).
47. See id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a)).
48. See id.
49. See id. at 1333-34. Specifically, the court found that the plaintiff "presented sufficient evidence for a
reasonable jury to find.., the peer review action was not taken after a 'reasonable effort to obtain the facts of the
matter.' Id. at 1333. Thus, the court apparently determined that the defendants failed to satisfy element (2) of the
Act's peer review standards. See 42 U.S.C. § 11 112(a)(2).
50. See Brown, 101 F.3d at 1333-34 (noting Dr. Lindley's opinion that Dr. Brown "obtained appropriate
consultation when necessary").
51. See id.
52. See id. at 1334.
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deliberations, and the manner of peer review, 3 but did not note whether these
factors alone could create an issue regarding the HCQIA immunity presumption.
Rather, it apparently considered Dr. Lindley's opinion regarding the data as
sufficient evidence to create a jury question. 4
The defendants pointed to their own experts" and asserted that a "difference of
opinion among experts" does not create an issue regarding the reasonableness of the
peer review panel's actions. 5 6 The court flatly rejected this argument, speculating
that under this assumption, a peer review participant would enjoy absolute
immunity from liability, so long as a participant had one expert to testify on his or
her behalf. 7 The court expressed concern that this position would contradict
Congress' provision for "qualified immunity,"5 8 and would deny the jury its
responsibilities.59
V. ANALYSIS
The HCQIA seeks to improve the quality of medical care by encouraging
effective, good faith professional peer review. 6 The Tenth Circuit's decision in
Brown substantially narrows the protection afforded peer review participants under
the HCQIA. In doing so, the Brown court may have undermined the purpose and
functions of the Act.6
A. The Role of Expert Witness Testimony
The Brown court found that Dr. Lindley's testimony, standing alone, was a
sufficient basis for the plaintiff to ultimately overcome the presumption that the
defendant made a reasonable effort to obtain the facts.62 It based this decision on a
fear that finding immunity despite a difference of professional opinion would
contravene "Congress' intention to provide 'qualified immunity,"' by rendering
peer review participants "absolutely immune from liability for [their] actions. 63
The Tenth Circuit's fears are exaggerated because the HCQIA does not provide
absolute immunity to a defendant. The Act was designed to provide peer review
participants with immunity from monetary damages, subject to satisfaction of the

53. See id. at 1333. The facts of the peer review process were not in dispute. The formal peer review panel
reviewed two charts, deliberated approximately two hours, and heard testimony from both Drs. Williams and
Brown. See id.
54. "Thus, from Dr. Lindley's testimony, a reasonable jury could have found the panel's review... not
taken after a 'reasonable effort to obtain the facts."' Id. at 1334 (emphasis added).
55. "[Tlhe defendants presented evidence from a number of doctors who testified the review panel's actions
satisfied the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a)." Id. at 1334 n.9.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id. (citing Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917, 930 (10th Cir. 1984)).
"[Tihe jury's responsibility [is] to weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of witnesses." Id.
60. See 42 U.S.C. § 11101 (1994).
61. See id. § 11101(3), (5) (noting the need to promote medical peer review by providing "incentive[s] and
protection for physicians engaging in effective professional peer review").
62. See Brown, 101 F.3d at 1334. "Thus,from Dr.Lindley's testimony, a reasonable jury could have found
the panel's review to be unreasonably restrictive and not taken after a 'reasonable effort to obtain the facts."' Id.
(emphasis added).
63. Id. at 1334 n.9.
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required conditions. 64 In reviewing the legislative history, the Tenth Circuit itself
noted in Decker v. IHC Hospitals,Inc., 65 that the HCQIA "provides protection only
66
from damages in private actions, and onlyfor properpeer review." Therefore, a
is always
defendant may be shielded from damages in some circumstances, but
relief.67
injunctive
or
declaratory
for
plaintiff
the
to
subject
potentially
The Brown court's view of conflicting expert opinion is unique among its cited
cases. The courts in the cited cases found that conflicting expert testimony might
create a question as to whether the peer review action itself (suspension or
revocation of privileges) was correct, but did not find that this conflict created a
material issue regarding the defendants' "reasonableness" requirements related to
42 U.S.C. § 11112(a) immunity criteria.68
B. The HCQIA Reasonable Effort Element
The cases cited in Brown do not specifically address the effect of conflicting
expert testimony on the presumption regarding a "reasonable effort to obtain the
facts of the matter."'69 However, in Mathews v. LancasterGeneralHospitalthe court
examined the general meaning and application of "reasonable effort" within the
context of 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a)(2).7"
The plaintiff in Mathews challenged the reasonableness of the committee's
efforts alleging a lack of committee integrity7 rather than on the basis of conflicting
expert reports." The Mathews court determined that the "totality of the process"

64. "The threat of private money damage liability.., discourages physicians from participating in effective
professional peer review." 42 U.S.C. § 11101(4) (1994) (emphasis added). A participant whose peer review action
"meets all the standards specified in section 11112(a)... shall not be liable in damages... with respect to the
action." Id. § 1111 l(a)(1) (emphasis added).
65. 982 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1992).
66. Id. at 437 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 99-903, at 9 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6384, 6391)
(second emphasis added).
67. See Bryan v. Holmes, 33 F.3d 1318, 1322 (1 th Cir. 1994). "Congress granted immunity fror monetary
damages ... while preserving causes of action for injunctive or declaratory relief .. ." Id.
68. See, e.g., Austin v. McNamara, 979 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1992). In that case, a Judicial Review Committee
(JRC) found that the Medical Executive Committee's (MEC) decision to revoke the plaintiff's privileges was
"unreasonable." See id at 732. The Austin court, in upholding the defendant's immunity under the Act, determined
that the JRC's statements called into question the ultimate reasonableness of the plaintiffs suspension, but not the
MEC's "reasonable belief that the [suspension] was warranted." Id. at 735. See also Mathews v. Lancaster Gen.
Hosp., 87 F.3d 624 (3d Cir. 1996). In Mathews, the plaintiff's expert report conflicted with the results of the
defendants' outside reviewer. See id. at 636 n.9. The court found that while "conflicting reports raise an issue of
fact as to whether [the plaintiff] provided acceptable care, they do not call into question whether the Board's
decision in relying on the [outside] report was reasonable" related to § 111 12(a)(1). Id. Likewise, the Mathews
court found that the same conflicting reports regarding § 11 112(a)(4) did not "rebut the presumption that the Board
made its decision in the reasonable belief that [the action] ... was warranted by the facts known." Id. at 638.
69. The Mathews court discussed "reasonable effort" without referring to conflicting testimony. See
Mathews, 87 F.3d at 637. Austin considered conflicting expert reports, but did not focus on "reasonable effort" as
a separate element. See Austin, 979 F.2d at 735. In Island v. Covenant Medical Center, 822 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D.
Iowa 1992) the court examined only the element of "notice and hearing" under the Act and no conflicting expert
reports were at issue. See id. at 1377-78.
70. See Mathews, 87 F.3d at 637.
71. See id. The plaintiff claimed that a failure of reasonable effort was demonstrated by the presence of
competitors on the review committee, lack of independent investigation of the committee, and lack of consideration
of routine internal quality reviews. See id.
72. See id. (noting that the plaintiff's expert report reached a contrary conclusion regarding acceptability
of the plaintiff-physician's care).
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leading up to a board's action should evidence a "reasonable effort to obtain the
facts" in order to satisfy the requirement of 42 U.S.C. § I 1112(a)(2).73 The court
examined several factors as part of the "totality of the process" related to a
"reasonable effort:" (1) number of recommendations to the board; (2) length
of
review; and (3) number of cases reviewed.74 In finding that the defendants met the
42 U.S.C. § 11 112(a)(2) requirement, the Mathews court made no reference to the
plaintiffs contradictory expert report.75 Interestingly, the Brown court never
referenced Mathews in its analysis of "reasonable effort," despite the fact that it is
the only cited case that examines that element in any significant detail.
The court in Austin v. McNamara76 also discussed "reasonable effort," albeit
within the context of a peer reviewer's reasonable belief that the action was
warranted.77 The plaintiff in Austin based his challenge to the peer review panel's
action partially on the conflicting recommendations of the Judicial Review
Committee (JRC).78 The JRC found the plaintiff's suspension "unreasonable" and
reinstated him, subject to consultations and review.79 In light of the JRC's
reinstatement conditions, the court determined that "no reasonable jury could find
that the JRC report is sufficient to establish the nonexistence of the defendants'
'reasonable belief and 'reasonable effort."'" It is unclear whether the Austin
court
intended its reasoning to apply to each phrase independently or to the section as a
whole, because the court examined "reasonable effort" only in conjunction with the
"reasonable belief' clause of 42 U.S.C. § 111 12(a)(4).8 ' As with Mathews,
the
Brown court did not refer to Austin in its discussion of reasonable effort.
C. Summary Judgment Issues
The Brown court also expressed concern about interfering with the jury functions
of weighing evidence and determining witness credibility.8 2 Despite the court's
concerns, the HCQIA is designed to dispose of peer review immunity issues sooner
rather than later. For example, legislative history indicates that the HCQIA
specifically intended for courts to make early determinations of defendant immunity
under its provisions.8 3 The Eleventh Circuit in Bryan v. Holmes84 interpreted this

73. See id.
74. See id. The peer review action in Mathews followed a two year investigation that included an internal
and outside review, two board recommendations and 208 chart reviews. See id.
75. The court's opinion does not indicate whether the plaintiff raised the expert's contradictory report as
a challenge to the reasonableness of the panel's efforts. See id.
76. 979 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1992).
77. See id. at 735; see also 42 U.S.C. § Il 112(a)(4) (1994).
78. See Austin, 979 F.2d at 734-35.
79. See id. at 732.
80. Id. at 735.
81. The clause requires "reasonable belief that the action was warranted by the facts known after such
reasonable effort to obtain facts." 42 U.S.C. § 111 12(a)(4).
82. See Brown v. Presbyterian Healthcare Servs., 101 F.3d 1324, 1334 n.9 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
117 S.Ct. 1461 (1997) (citing Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917, 930 (10th Cir.
1984)).
83. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-903, at 12 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6384, 6394.
The Committee intends that these provisions allow defendants to file motions to resolve the
issue of immunity in as expeditious a manner as possible. The provisions... allow a court to
make a determination that the defendant has or has not met the standards ....
even though other
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history to mean that the Act's immunity is a question of law to be decided by the
court, and further recommended that the merits of the case be referred to the jury
85
without reference to the immunity issues. Although the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals prefers to resolve HCQIA immunity motions at summary judgment, it
86
allows for jury participation in certain circumstances.
D. JudicialAlternatives
To effect its laudable goals, the Act must provide clear, predictable standards that
insure immunity to a compliant peer reviewer. Courts must apply the standards
evenly and consistently in every case. Otherwise, physicians' lack of confidence in
the judicial enforcement of the statute's protection might well result in the
reluctance to participate in effective peer review which initially inspired the
HCQIA's enactment."
There are various ways that courts in the future might determine the immunity
issues under the HCQIA. The following alternatives attempt to describe clear,
predictable standards or require a greater sufficiency of evidence to rebut the
immunity presumption compared with the Tenth Circuit's relatively weak
"difference of professional opinion" standard.
1. Court-Determined Standards
The Brown court could have weighed the evidence presented by the experts
without reference to their opinions regarding the reasonableness of the defendant's
action. In essence, this means considering objective evidence such as length of
review and number of charts. The court could determine minimal standards that
would satisfy the "reasonable effort" requirement for immunity, in the same way
that the Act currently provides safe harbor criteria that satisfy the "adequate notice
and hearing" requirement.88 Although experts could testify regarding medical
diagnoses, acceptability of treatment regimes, and other medical/technical issues,
their testimony would become irrelevant on the question of what constitutes a
"reasonable effort" in a peer review action. The obvious advantages to this approach

issues in the case remain to be resolved.
issues in
Id. The American Medical Association (AMA) supported this congressional intent to resolve immunity
amicus
(referencing
1994)
Cir.
th
(11
n.25
1332
1318,
F.3d
33
Holmes,
v.
Bryan
See
litigation.
of
stages
early
the
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are its "bright-line" qualities: ease of application, efficiency and predictability.
The primary drawbacks to this approach flow from its standardized nature. Rigid
criteria may deny peer review panels the flexibility in responding to various
situations. For instance, a panel's brief investigation of one particularly egregious
incident may constitute a sufficiently reasonable effort to obtain the facts prior to
revoking a physician's privileges. On the other hand, a panel may satisfy the
"reasonable efforts" criteria without expending the efforts actually necessary
under
the circumstances.
2. Modified "Difference of Professional Opinion" Standard
The Brown court could have found that a professional difference of opinion
regarding the reasonableness of the peer review panel's efforts does not create a
jury question. Alternatively, the court could have found that an expert's testimony
that no reasonable professional could consider the peer review effort reasonable,
does create an issue for the jury. 9 This approach would satisfy the Tenth Circuit
Court's concern with removing issues from the jury.' ° This requirement essentially
raises the bar that the plaintiff must meet, thereby strengthening the defendant's
damage immunity presumption under the HCQIA.9 t
This method of dealing with conflicting expert testimony is easy to apply, and
the court can quickly dispense with immunity issues under the HCQIA. The
disadvantage is that its potentially narrow focus will prevent the court from
considering additional circumstances, facts, and testimony on this issue. This
standard evokes the same type of dilemma as the Brown court's "difference of
opinion" standard.'
3. Judicial Assistance
Part of the difficulty with deciding immunity issues under the HCQIA is the
necessity for judges and juries to evaluate conflicting expert testimony.93 How does

89. The difference in this assertion is that the plaintiff's expert is, in effect, expressing not only his or her
opinion that the defendant failed to act reasonably, but that no reasonable professional couldfind otherwise.
Arguably, the HCQIA immunity presumption is intended to protect the reasonable physician peer reviewer. See,
e.g., Bryan, 33 F.3d at 1333 (noting that the HCQIA presumption places the burden on the plaintiff to "prov[e] that
the peer review process was not reasonable"). However, reasonable physicians can and do disagree. This standard
avoids the creation of a jury question simply where reasonable physicians disagree.
90. Rather than removing the issue from the jury, this approach would simply require a stricter standard of
conflicting expert testimony in order to create a jury question. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text
(noting the Brown court's concern in finding immunity despite the existence of differing expert opinions).
91. This standard applied in Brown would have resulted in the defendants retaining damages immunity
under the HCQIA because Dr. Lindley testified only that he considered the panel's efforts unreasonable. See Brown
v. Presbyterian Healthcare Servs., 101 F.3d 1324, 1334 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1461 (1997). On
the other hand, under this approach, if Lindley further stated that no reasonable physician/peer reviewer could
consider the panel's effort to obtain the facts reasonable, the court would find that his testimony created a jury
question on that issue.
92. See id. at 1334 n.9. Plaintiffs will likely overcome the HCQIA's presumption of immunity (or create
a jury question on the issue) if they can obtain one qualified witness who is willing to testify in this manner.
Similarly, defendants will likely retain damages immunity if plaintiffs lack a witness' opinion to this effect.
93. See, e.g., Paul S. Milich, ControversialScience in the Courtroom: Daubert and the Law's Hubris,43
EMORY L.J. 913, 914, 923 (1994) (noting the problem of asking juries to decide the scientific reliability of
principles and methods propounded by various expert witnesses).
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one determine whether the plaintiff's or defendant's expert has accurately assessed
a medical peer review panel's effort to obtain the facts? Lay judges and juries may
not possess the background to knowledgeably sift through the facts and methods of
medical peer review. Moreover, lay persons may have difficulty assigning weight
to conflicting expert testimony.94 Medical peer reviewers may feel insecure taking
peer review action that might be evaluated by uncertain lay standards.
The court could enlist the assistance of various individuals in resolving difficult
or complex technical issues related to the medical peer review process and the
application of HCQIA immunity. Examples of available judicial support include
97
masters, 95 court-appointed experts,96 and advisory juries. A comprehensive
9
examination of these judicial tools is beyond the scope of this Note.
Masters and court-appointed experts appear to be particularly suited to resolving
99
issues engendered by the HCQIA's immunity standards. Masters wield broad
powers, and subject to judicial discretion, may rule on the admissibility of evidence,
take witness testimony, and render findings of fact and conclusions of law."
Therefore, an expert master can be an extremely flexible tool.' Court-appointed
experts are provided for in Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Experts may
serve the court by presenting a neutral assessment of the scientific methods and
principles at issue. °2 Although they do not possess the extensive scope of authority
available to masters, their range of duties make them extremely useful in scientific,
technical, and complex cases."0 3 Although judicial experts can provide valuable

94. See, e.g., Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Wiliging, Accepting Daubert's Invitation: Defining a Role for
Court-AppointedExperts in Assessing Scientific Validity, 43 EMORY LJ. 995, 1009-10 (1994) (describing judicial
appointments of experts to assist the court in understanding unfamiliar technical subjects and conflicting expert
testimony).
95. See FED. R. CIv. P. 53.
96. See FED. R. EviD. 706.
97. See FED. R. Civ. P. 39.
98. There is much written material on the subject of judicial assistance in technical cases. See generally,
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (1994) (discussing the judicial
management of expert evidence); Cecil & Willging, supra note 94 (examining the use of court-appointed experts);
Jody Weisberg Menon, Note, Adversarial Medical and Scientific Testimony and Lay Jurors:A Proposalfor
Medical Malpractice Reform, 21 AM. J.L & MED. 281 (1995) (discussing lay judge and jury understanding of
medical and scientific testimony); John W. Wesley, Note, Scientific Evidence and the Question of Judicial
Capacity, 25 WM. & MARY L REV..675 (1984) (examining the ability of lay judiciary to comprehend complex
technical information and the use of judicial tools).
99. Federal rules prohibit the use of advisory juries in cases where trial by jury is a right. See FED. R. CIV.
P. 39(c).
100. See FED. R. Civ. P. 53(c), (e); Margaret G. Farrell, Special Masters, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE supranote 98, at 575, 598 (1994).
101. In a case similar to Brown, the court might simply request a master to render his or her personal expert
opinion regarding the peer review panel's efforts, and consider the testimony as a piece of evidence. Alternatively,
the court could direct the master to issue a conclusion of law determining whether the defendants met the
requirement of conducting a "reasonable effort to obtain the facts of the matter."
102. See Milich, supra note 93, at 925.
103. Commentators have noted how courts utilize the various roles of the expert. In one case, the courtappointed expert advised the court on computer technology, pointing out legal deficiencies and suggesting different
standards. See Cecil & Willging, supranote 94, at 1000-01 (discussing Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 775
F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), affid in relevantpart, 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992)).The judge adopted and applied
the expert's suggested standard. See id. at 1001. The court of appeals upheld a challenge to the expert's role in that
case, finding that the technical nature of the controversy justified the expert's expanded role. See id. In contrast,
the court-appointed expert in another case rendered an opinion only on the narrow issue of the scientific
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assistance to the bench, another consideration is the potential for increased litigation
costs if the case goes to trial.' 4
4. Subjective Intent Standard
Probably the least judicially acceptable approach, but perhaps most in accord
with the original legislative intent of the HCQIA, the court might have examined
evidence of the peer reviewers' subjective intent or motives in its determination of
immunity under the 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a) criteria. The court could consider
evidence indicating a defendant's animosity or hostility toward the plaintiff when
evaluating the "reasonable belief' behind a peer review participant's action.'1 5
Thus, the court might have reached the same result, removal of the defendants from
HCQIA immunity, for different reasons. '° This approach finds support in the Act's
language," 7 legislative history,'0 8 and some court dicta."° Moreover, judicial
evaluation of a peer review committee's motives might have the beneficial result
of encouraging an impartial peer review process." 0 However, it is unlikely that
courts will adopt this approach in light of the overwhelming judicial preference for
the objective standard."'
VI. IMPLICATIONS
A. Effect on ProfessionalPeer Review
The critical problem inherent in the Brown ruling is its potential chilling effect
on rigorous, effective, peer review activity among health care professionals. The
decision creates the potential for the inverse of the "absolute immunity" scenario
acceptability of a specific calculation. See id. at 1001-02 (discussing Renaud v. Martin Marietta Corp., 749 F.
Supp. 1545 (D. Colo. 1990), affd,972 F.2d 304 (10th Cir. 1992)).
104. Masters and court-appointed experts are compensated from specified funds or the costs may be allocated
to the parties. See FED. R. Civ. P. 53(a); FhD. R. EVID. 706(b). On the other hand, if a case is disposed of by a
master without a trial, the cost may be insignificant compared to that of a three week trial.
105. Judge Pregerson's dissenting opinion supported this approach in Austin v. McNamara, 979 F.2d 728,
741 n.3 (9th Cir. 1992). "Evidence of motive and intent is relevant to show whether the defendants possessed a
reasonable belief that the final revocation was warranted by the facts known." Id.
106. The court might have found that evidence of the defendants' anti-competitive motives or hostility
created a question of whether the peer review panel acted in a "reasonable belief' that the revocation "was in
furtherance of quality health care." 42 U.S.C. § I 1112(a)(1) (1994).
107. See supra note 28.
108. See supra note 29.
109. Although circuit courts unanimously agree that the Act's immunity requirements establish an objective
standard, see supra note 30, a few have discussed subjective elements (bias, hostility) in reaching their decisions.
For instance, the court held in Mathews v. Lancaster General Hospital that subjective intent was irrelevant in
determining whether the defendants had a reasonable belief that peer review action was taken in furtherance of
quality health care. See 87 F.3d 624, 636 (3d Cir. 1996). Nevertheless, in upholding HCQIA immunity regarding
§ 111 12(a)(1), the same court stated that "the evidence supports the conclusion that defendants were motivated by
legitimate health care concerns." Id. (emphasis added). Likewise, the court in Bryan v. Holmes declared that
"assertions of hostility" were irrelevant in determining HCQIA immunity, but only after noting a lack of evidence
that such hostility determined the peer review outcome. See 33 F.3d 1318, 1335 (11 th Cir. 1994). These cases seem
to indicate a judicial willingness to consider the peer reviewers' underlying motives for taking action.
110. Health care institutions may screen out peer review members with strong anti-competitive motives or
personal conflicts to insure a more disinterested, unbiased peer review panel. Alternatively, "outside review" may
be officially incorporated into the peer review process.
111. See cases cited supra note 30.
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2
that the court feared would result if it reversed the lower court decision." Under
its ruling, a plaintiff can create a jury question regarding the defendant's immunity
presumption by producing an expert witness who testifies that one or more elements
were not met. This result frustrates Congress' intent to improve the quality of
medical care through professional peer review,13 by weakening the HCQIA's
peer review."" 4
"incentive and protection for physicians engaging in effective
The Brown decision rendered the HCQIA's immunity presumption virtually
meaningless by reducing the evidentiary burden required to rebut it. A jury question
immediately results when a plaintiff produces an expert witness who testifies that
the peer review process was unreasonable. After Brown, health care institutions face
a dilemma in monitoring the quality of their medical personnel. Facilities that
restrict staff privileges may face increased risk of litigation by the disciplined staff
member." 5 On the other hand, the unrestricted activity of incompetent staff exposes
the facility to claims of negligence." 6 Fearing personal liability for monetary
damages, peer review panel members may attempt to avoid finding professional
misconduct," 7 resulting in meaningless peer review proceedings. A decrease in
effective medical peer review will likely be accompanied by a corresponding
decline in the quality of patient care. 1

B. Suggestionsfor Practitioners
1. Defendant's Perspective
Attorneys for medical institutions, both in-house counsel and consultants, may
face the issues presented in Brown. There are two areas of concerns following the
court's decision.
First, peer review must be sufficient in scope to minimize the risk that an expert
will testify that it did not constitute a reasonable effort to obtain the facts. Although
a review of one chart may establish a violation, the moral of Brown suggests that
more is required than an examination of that chart. The Tenth Circuit did not
establish a minimum number of chart reviews that satisfy the "reasonable effort"
standard." 9 Nevertheless, a panel should consider reviewing at a minimum, a cross-

112. See Brown v. Presbyterian Healthcare Servs., 101 F.3d 1324, 1334 n.9 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct. 1461 (1997) (expressing concern that peer review defendants would enjoy absolute immunity if one
expert testifies that HCQIA standards were met).
113. See 42 U.S.C. § 11101(1), (3) (1994).
114. Id. § 11101(5).
115. See John Neff, Note, Physician Staff Privilege Cases: Antitrust Liability and the Health Care Quality

Improvement Act, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 609, 612-14 (1988) (discussing the importance of hospital staff
privileges to physicians); John E. Graf, Comment, Patrick v. Burget: Has the Death Knell Soundedfor State Action
Immunity inPeer Review Antitrust Suits?, 51 U. PrrT. L REv. 463, 468-70 (1990) (noting the increase in lawsuits
resulting from denial and revocation of physician privileges).
BARRY R. FURROW ET AL, HEALTH LAW 274-76 (3d ed. 1997) (noting cases which held that
116. See, e.g.,
hospitals have a duty to properly screen or restrict medical staff privileging).
117. See, e.g., Neff, supra note 115, at 632 (noting physician reluctance to participate in peer review in light
of potential antitrust liability).
Hammack, supra note 87, at 437 (discussing the importance of the medical peer review
118. See, e.g.,
process as a means of maintaining the quality of health care).
119. See Brown v. Presbyterian Healthcare Servs., 101 F.3d 1324 (10th Cir. 1996), cert.denied, 117 S.Ct.
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section or a random sampling of a particular physician's charts as part of its
process. 2 Ideally, institutional policy should require sufficient time to conduct a
thorough review, and provide for evaluation by more than one panel.'
Second, it is important to avoid any evidence of bad faith motivation on the part
of the peer reviewers. After Brown, it is likely that the issues regarding peer review
immunity will go to a jury trial.'22 Ideally, the peer review process should exclude
any member from participating in a review of a physician with whom s/he has a
personal conflict or strong competitive relationship.'2 3
2. Plaintiff's Perspective
Attorneys representing physicians who are the subject of an adverse peer review
action also need to be familiar with Brown. If there is evidence that the disciplinary
action was motivated by hostility, animosity, or anti-competitive motives toward the
plaintiff physician, the attorney should consider exploiting the "subjective"
language ("reasonable belief") incorporated in two of the required elements for
HCQIA immunity. 4 However, an argument that the defendant's bad faith motives
are sufficient to overcome the Act's immunity presumption will probably fail if the
courts continue to construe the 42 U.S.C. § 11112(a) elements as establishing an
25
objective standard of conduct.
The plaintiff attorney should retain a competent expert witness who, after
reviewing the evidence, will testify not only that the peer review action itself was
unreasonable, but that the peer review process was unreasonably conducted as well.
Particularly strong will be an expert's testimony that the requirements of 42 U.S.C.

1461 (1997). The court pointed out that the plaintiffs expert, Dr. Lindley, reviewed all of Dr. Brown's obstetrical
patient charts spanning a six month period. Id. at 1333-34. The court further noted Dr. Lindley's opinion that the
formal review of "only two charts" was "unreasonably narrow," and that from Lindley's testimony a jury could find
the panel's review "not taken after a 'reasonable effort to obtain the facts."' Id. at 1334.
120. See, e.g., Mathews v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 87 F.3d 624,637 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding reasonable effort
following a two year investigation involving 208 chart reviews); Austin v. McNamara, 979 F.2d 728, 731-32 (9th
Cir. 1991) (noting that thirty cases were initially examined, followed by five additional chart reviews prior to
privilege revocation).
121. Although the Tenth Circuit Court did not focus on these factors, other jurisdictions have specifically
cited them in determining whether a peer review effort was reasonable. See e.g., Bryan v. Holmes, 33 F.3d 1318,
1335 (11 th Cir. 1994) (finding "reasonable effort" after physician's conduct had been evaluated by the executive
committee, a peer review panel, and an appellate review panel); Smith v. Ricks, 31 F.3d 1478, 1486 (9th Cir. 1994)
(holding that plaintiff did not rebut presumption of "reasonable effort" when the hospital "conducted a thorough

review over the course of almost two years").
122. Although bad faith is irrelevant under an objective standard of HCQIA immunity, evidence of bad faith
may be presented to support other claims that require or permit proof of motivation. See supra note 36. A jury may
be confused by the variety of claims and elements and consider evidence of bad faith in determining whether a
defendant met the HCQIA immunity criteria. Thus, to avoid prejudice, a defendant might request the court to
separately consider the issue of immunity prior to the plaintiff's presentation of other claims. See FED. R. Cr. P.
42(b).
123.

Although a hostile staff member may raise an initial complaint regarding a physician, there should be

no further involvement of the complaining member beyond that necessary to gather information for peer review
purposes.
124. See 42 U.S.C. § lll12(a)(l), (4) (1994).
125. In order to introduce evidence of the defendant's bad faith, consider presenting claims that require or
permit evidence of the defendant's motivation, together with the claim that the defendant lacks HCQIA immunity.
See, e.g., supra note 36.
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§ 11112(a) were not met, and that no reasonable peer review participant could find
otherwise.
VII. CONCLUSION
Who would accept a judgeship if she were potentially liable for damages when
a litigant suffers an adverse decision? Similarly, in the absence of strong, clearly
defined immunity from private damage awards, what physician will step forward
to "judge" another in the context of professional peer review?
In a typical professional peer review action, both the reviewer and the one
reviewed have critical interests at stake. The scrutinized physician is concerned that
she will lose her staff privileges. The peer reviewer fears that an adverse panel
decision may lead to a money damage award for an aggrieved physician who files
a claim against an individual panel member. Similarly, a healthcare institution is
potentially subject to liability for failure to screen out incompetent staff, while at
the same time it risks litigation from a physician whose privileges it revokes.
The Tenth Circuit Court's decision in Brown eroded the limited immunity of the
HCQIA afforded to those who participate in professional peer review. By allowing
one expert's conflicting testimony to question peer review immunity under the
HCQIA, the court has taken a step toward dismantling strong, effective medical
peer review.
DIANE GUPTON

